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9■ STUDIE
The Society of Individuals: How to Solve the Dilemma  
of Individualism and Holism in Historical Sociology*1
J I Ř Í  Š U B R T * * 2
Společnost individuí: Jak vyřešit dilema individualismu a holismu v historické sociologii
Abstract: One of the questions that Norbert Elias tries to resolve in his work – either explicitly 
or implicitly – is the issue of the relationship between the individual and society. Elias critically 
assesses two approaches to this issue that sociology offered in his time, namely the Weberian con-
ception of individualism that postulates the human individual as the starting point of sociological 
thought, and the Durkheimian conception of holism, which considered society as a whole as the 
starting point, giving regard to holistic, supra-individual social facts. Elias considers both of these 
solutions one-sided and unsatisfactory, and in his conception tries to supercede them. His strategy 
is close to that of Georg Simmel before him. It consists in highlighting the “third” that lies between 
the individual and society, which connects them. Simmel calls this “third” “Wechselwirkung”. Elias 
speaks about “figuration”. In this article, we consider how successful Elias’ strategy is, its merits 
and its shortcomings. At the end of the text, the author attempts to formulate his own solution 
of the discussed problem, which is different from Elias’s approach and based on the concept of 
“homo duplex”.
Keywords: individualism; holism; human individual; action; structure; figuration; homo duplex
DOI: 10.14712/23363525.2015.2
Norbert Elias’s book, The Society of Individuals, constantly comes back to the problem 
that the author characterizes as a gap in Western thinking which has opened up between 
the individual and society and is not easy to bridge [Elias 2006: 25]. There are two oppos-
ing parties of opinion: the proponents of one view claim that “Everything depends on the 
individual,” while others believe that “Everything depends on society”. The former argue 
that there are always particular individuals who decide what will and will not be done. The 
latter argue that what individuals do is always socially conditioned [ibid.: 68].
All our thinking is thus affected by antinomies. We have an idea of what we are as human 
individuals and also some idea of what society is, but these two images are not a very good fit. 
Nevertheless there is no doubt that individuals make up society and every society is a society 
of individuals [ibid.: 15]. Although we suppose that the “gap” between the individual and 
society does not really exist, our way of thinking is influenced by this polarity, which con-
stantly fissures it. One of the issues that Elias focused on in his sociology is how to overcome 
this polarity of thought and bridge the long-standing metaphorical gap.
The antinomies which Elias referred to are associated with various terminological ref-
erences in current theoretical literature. Jeffrey C. Alexander [1987] distinguishes between 
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individualistic and collectivist theories. In the book, Contemporary Philosophy of Social 
Sciences, Brian Fay employs the mutual counter-position conceptual pair – atomism and 
holism. According to atomism, each individual represents a distinct unit of social life 
endowed with the ability to “control their own action on the basis of their beliefs and 
desires” [Fay 2002: 45]. Atomists understand society as a collection of individuals and at 
the same time consider social units to be transferable to the activities of the individuals 
who create them. Fay connects atomism with the strong belief in the “fundamental singu-
larity of individuals”, who are considered “as if what they are, were independent of their 
relations to other people” [ibid.: 46]. He considers Thomas Hobbes to be the philosoph-
ical founder of atomism, while in the social sciences of the 20th century this position is 
strongly represented by Friedrich von Hayek, who argues that social phenomena cannot be 
understood other than through understanding the individual acts of individuals. In soci-
ology the origins of such methodological individualism are associated with Max Weber.
The opposite of atomism is holism, which Fay describes as the doctrine, “according to 
which the properties of individuals are solely a function of their place in society or some 
broad system of meanings” [ibid.: 67]. According to holism it is always necessary to take 
social units as the basis of social theory, not their individual members. Holism does not 
allow for theories of social units to be reduced or transfered to theories of individuals. For 
the social sciences a key personality of holism is Émile Durkheim; Fay considers the modern 
version of holism to include structuralism in particular (Lévi-Strauss, Foucault and others).
The opposition that Fay describes has a number of aspects that can be expressed in the 
form of related dualisms. Derek Layder mentions three of them in his book Understanding 
Social Theory [1994: 3]. There are the dualisms: individual – social, micro – macro and 
action – structure. The distinction individual – social, which the author considers to be 
the oldest and also the most persistent dilemma of sociological thought, corresponds in 
principle with the opposition atomism – holism, addressed by Fay. Layder points out that 
the problem of this dualism lies in the fact that individuals cannot be placed in sharp oppo-
sition to society simply because many of the needs and motivations that influence human 
individuals are produced by the social environment of the society in which they live. Put 
simply, there is no society without the individuals who define it, and at the same time there 
are no individuals beyond the influence of society [ibid. 1994: 3].
Individualism versus holism
The individualistic (atomistic) interpretation presumes that in all social action the indi-
vidual is the starting point, often referred to as the (individual) actor and his action, which 
carries a certain sense of meaning. Individualistic opinion assumes that all social phenom-
ena consist of the many different, interrelated and interconnected actions of individuals, 
and moreover that these – often complex – phenomena can be retrospectively attributed to 
the actions of individual actors. The principles of individualistic sociology were formulated 
by Max Weber.
For Weber, Sociology is the science of social action. In his 1913 essay Über einige Kate-
gorien der verstehenden Soziologie he notes that the subject of sociology is the social action 
of individuals and its aim is to understand and explain the course of this action through 
the meaning that the acting individuals themselves attributed to it [Weber 1988: 432–438]. 
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In his later work Basic Sociological Terms, Weber characterizes sociology as a science to 
understand social action and thereby causally explain its course and its effects [Weber 
1998: 136]. A key element in this concept is the German term Verstehen – understanding, 
from which is derived the designation of Weber’s sociology as die verstehende Soziologie – 
understanding sociology. 
In terms of Weber’s sociology all social phenomena, formations, and the entire social 
order, are human creations which consist of social relationships between acting individuals 
that pursue their own goals and value orientations; they are series, or complexes, of the 
interconnected actions of human individuals.
Generally speaking, individualistic opinion attributes primacy to the subjective, sover-
eign, individual free will, applied in the actions of human individuals. The individualistic 
perspective brings a “view from below” that sees the individual as an actor who creates 
social reality with his activities on the basis of how he understands the world affairs around 
him, how he interprets them and what meaning or significance he attributes to his actions. 
Society, social institutions, structures and systems, are something built (if need be con-
structed) from below, as a result of the interconnected actions of individuals, and thus the 
result of interpersonal interactions. 
Holism, on the other hand, is based on the philosophical assumption that the whole 
is more than the collection of its component parts. Therefore social reality cannot be 
explained by reference to individuals and their individual actions, but must be explained 
on the basis of its own principles. Émile Durkheim claims that the subjects of sociology 
are so-called social facts, whose primary feature is that they are supra-individual, exter-
nal to the individual, and entering consciousness as something external, independent of 
the will. The second essential characteristic is that they are endowed with coercive power 
and are able to exercise social pressure for the individual to conform to [Durkheim 1926: 
36–37, 46].
Examples of social facts for Durkheim are such phenomena as religion, language, law 
or morality. In the book The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, he says: we speak a lan-
guage which we have not ourselves created, we use tools which we have not ourselves 
invented, and we claim rights which we have not ourselves established. Each successive 
generation inherits a sum of knowledge which it did not collect itself and which it owes 
to society. The environment in which we live seems to us to be populated by forces that 
control us, but are also helpful to us. And these forces influence us by pressure which we 
conform to [Durkheim 2002: 235].
Durkheim sees society as a reality of a special kind which cannot simply be identified 
with the sum of its individual parts, because it has its own specific qualities that cannot 
be transferred to individuals. In relation to the individual it is the social or collective that 
is determining and that the individual submits to. Society has primacy over the individ-
ual in that it existed long before the individual and will be there long afterwards. It is the 
whole that has the ability to force individuals to live and act in a certain way. In the holistic 
perspective, individual actions are seen not as a result of the sovereign decision of the 
individual, but as a consequence of social (functional) pressures that society imposes on 
human individuals, which they obey.
The history of the sociology of the 20th century shows that both lines of interpreta-
tion – individualistic and holistic – presented viable exploratory strategies that transformed 
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themselves into many specific forms, into a series of sociological schools and specializa-
tions. Through the individualistic approach we can encounter utilitarian theories, based 
on the concept of homo oeconomicus (exchange theory, rational choice theory), but also 
interpretive sociology (in particular, phenomenological sociology). From holism on the 
other hand arise first and foremost structuralism, then functionalism and systems theo-
ry. However, alongside this, several exploratory approaches emerged in the 20th century 
which viewed both these tendencies as one-sided and limited, and attempted to overcome 
them by bridging or linking them. In the framework of this movement we can include the 
contribution to sociological theory of Norbert Elias.
Elias in his sociology seeks quite systematically to overcome the contradiction between 
Weberian and Durkheimian sociology. Both approaches, according to Elias, commit the 
same mistake – an artificial, analytical separation of the individual and society which they 
use to emphasize divergent perspectives. Our thinking moves between the two extremes 
which permeate sociological theory; the first understands the individual as being outside 
society, and the second society as in opposition to the individual. The problem of the rela-
tionship between the individual and society is, according to Elias, unresolved in sociology. 
Both individualism and holism tend to take their starting points (in one case the per-
sonality of the individual, in the other, the objectivity of supra-individual social reali-
ty) as something distinctive which has a privileged position, both in the ontological and 
epistemological senses. Both interpretative lines at the same time face certain problems, 
limits and restrictions; in both cases there is a danger of reductionism and simplification. 
Individualism is strong in the interpretation of phenomena taking place at the micro social 
level, but usually it has trouble capturing what goes beyond the level of individuals and 
their interpersonal relationships. It lacks the theoretical tools for the explanation of such 
macro-social phenomena as culture, civilization, modernization, industrialism, globaliza-
tion or the social functioning of societal subsystems. In other words, individualistic think-
ing has a problem with grasping what goes beyond the level of interaction. Representatives 
of individualism are not commonly willing to admit that some processes are systemic in 
nature, i.e. their driving force is the system itself and its structures, and that some processes 
launch a systemic logic independent of the will of individuals. 
Even when they emphasize individualism – in terms of the individual’s volunta-
rism and free will – holistic approaches tend to credit all the supra-individual influ-
ences, pressures and systemic processes that are independent of the will of individuals. 
Behind everything, holism sees specific manifestations of supra-individual entities or the 
functioning of the social structures, systems or subsystems which individuals must go 
through. The exclusion of individuals from the perspective of theoretical thinking leads 
holism to attribute vital functions to social wholes – which means systems. Supporters of 
holism tend to consider the macro level of social reality; as for individuals, they ignore 
their subjectivity and individual initiative, and on the contrary emphasize conformity 
and subordination. Elias subjected both tendencies to criticism. He believed that neither 
leads to an adequate understanding of society. One recognizes it only as an aggregate of 
individuals, the other as something that exists outside individuals and independently of 
them [Elias 2006b: 7].
Supporters of individualism, according to Elias, tend to base themselves on the “atoms”, 
the “smallest particles” of society. Individuals represent the firm “posts” between which 
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stretch the temporary “strings” of interpersonal relationships [ibid.: 28]. For those who are 
used to thinking in an individualistic way, it is difficult to understand that social relation-
ships may have their own structure and natural development [ibid.: 26]. On the contrary 
Elias emphasizes that each individual human being lives nestled into a network (“entangle-
ment”) of interpersonal relations, in which a number of features are dependent on others, 
and others are dependent on them. These relationships are at least partially reflected in 
personal character. The structure of these relationships is different in different types of 
societies, and no individual, whatever their personal qualities and dispositions, can break 
out of period-given facts and social frameworks, and nor meanwhile can they transform 
them [ibid.: 23, 63]. Moreover, each society has its own history and is able to change in 
a way that none of the individuals who jointly formed it anticipated or intended. Therefore, 
according to Elias, we must wonder how it happens that the coexistence and interaction of 
many human individuals leads to the creation of something new, which no one ever strived 
for and which nobody planned. 
As for holism, the supporters of this school, according to Elias, usually proceed from 
a model of thought based on the biological way of thinking. They imagine society only as 
something supra-individual, as a supra-individual organic substance that exists beyond 
individuals. As a holder of social principles, it is labelled the “collective spirit”, the “col-
lective organism”, or – in analogy with the forces of nature – supra-individual spiritual or 
material “forces” [ibid.: 26–27]. In this way of thinking there is no place for individuals.
According to Elias, neither of the two described tendencies adequately grasps what 
is going on in social reality, and consequently there opens an unbridgeable gap between 
social and individual phenomena. If we want to understand them correctly, we need to 
change our way of thinking, to abandon thinking focused on separate substances and 
move on to thinking focused on relationships and functions [ibid.: 28]. The structures of 
the human psyche, the structures of human society, and the structure of human history, 
do not exist as separately as it appears they do in today’s research. On the contrary, they 
are inseparable, complementary phenomena that can be explored only in their mutual 
relations [ibid.: 49].
During the 20th century there were other theorists who attempted to overcome the 
antinomy of individualism and holism. First of all there was Talcott Parsons, who, in his 
work The Structure of Social Action, tried to interconnect the ideas of Weber and Durkheim 
[Parsons 1966]. Later, there was Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann [1999], Jürgen 
Habermas [1981], Pierre Bourdieu [1998], Anthony Giddens [1984], Roy Bhaskar [1978], 
Margaret Archer [1995], Bruno Latour [2005], Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot [2007], 
and many others. In principle it is possible to distinguish in this effort two basic strategies. 
The first is based on postulating some “third” that is placed as a bolt between the individual 
and society to connect both poles. The second is led by the effort to bring together both 
poles – individual and collective – and put them into a single explanatory framework, so 
that in the explanation of social events these perspectives are alternated.
The origins of the first strategy can be traced back to Georg Simmel, whose conception 
of sociology can be interpreted as a response to the dispute between sociological nomi-
nalism and realism [Keller 2004: 357]. Extreme nominalism is the claim that only human 
individuals really exist, not society. Realism – on the contrary – not only ascribes objective 
existence to society and other social wholes, but in addition has a tendency to put society 
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above the individual. Simmel’s definition of sociology tries to take a specific position that 
avoids the extremes. Simmel stands apart from nominalism, emphasizing the primacy of 
sociability over individuality, and moreover admits that interactions between individuals 
result in specific social qualities that are not original to the acting persons. However, at the 
same time he distances himself from realism, from the substantialist concept of social real-
ity, and emphasizes its processual character. Society, according to Simmel, does not exist 
as a substance, but always as interaction between individuals [Simmel 1970: 27]. Simmel 
believes that society exists only because it is moment by moment re-created by the inter-
action of people, in which various forms of interpersonal association are lastingly formed, 
reproduced, but also abolished. Simmel highlights this as the third and the most important 
social phenomenon and refers to it as Wechselwirkung. 
A typical example of the second approach is Anthony Giddens and his theory of struc-
turation, in which the individual pole is represented by the term action, and the social pole 
by the name structure [Giddens 1984]. Giddens’s theory is based on a duality theorem of 
action and structure, which states that structures are the product of human action, but, 
once formed, they represent a tool for other human action; a tool which on the one hand 
allows such action, but on the other, directs and limits it. Giddens – simply put – shifts his 
standpoint throughout his theoretical interpretation to explain observed issues by alter-
nating individualistic and holistic positions. Essentially, he says: the first step is to adopt an 
individualistic position because it is individuals whose actions create structures; however, 
the second step is to adopt a holistic perspective, as these already-formed structures affect 
subsequent individual actions. The third step is to return to the individualistic point of 
view as individuals by their actions enable the existing structures not only to reproduce 
but to modify and transform.
These outlined strategies are not too different from each other; on the contrary they 
are complementary and have various points of contact. Regarding Elias, his solution to 
the question of relations between individual and society is the closest to Simmel’s, which 
he freely develops and deepens, and whose concept Wechselwirkung he replaces by the 
expression “meshing” (Verflechtung) of relations and then particularly by the concept of 
figuration. But Elias’s effort is at the same time associated with the effort to bring the two 
poles of the relationship – individual and society – together as closely as possible and to 
look alternatingly from both perspectives at ongoing social processes. 
Elias’s concept of figuration
Elias tried to overcome the extremes of individualism and holism – the two poles of 
social science – and to unify them, particularly by working out the concept of figuration, 
on which he focused especially in the book What is Sociology? [Elias 1970], but also in his 
other works (for example The Court Society [Elias 1983], The Established and the Outsiders 
[Elias – Scotson 1990]). The introduction of the concept of figuration is among his theo-
retical innovations. Through this concept he tries to overcome the traditional ideological 
polarization which pits subject against object, the individual against his surroundings (rep-
resented by various social groups), people as individuals against people as society. Figura-
tion is, for instance, family, school class, rural community or state. At first glance, it might 
seem that this term is close to what is commonly referred to in sociology as a social group, 
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but it is not like that. The concept of figuration draws attention to the interdependence of 
people, which means to what mutually connects them. It is a concept that can be related 
both to relatively small groups, and to big societies. Elias noted that he introduced the con-
cept in order to express more clearly and unambiguously the fact that what we call society 
is neither an abstraction of the characteristics of existing individuals without society, nor 
the “system” or “the whole” excluding individuals, but rather a tangle of interdependencies 
created by individuals [Elias 2006a: 50].
Simpler and more transparent figurations are created by teacher and pupils in the class-
room, doctor and patients in the therapeutic group, and regulars in the pub. More complex 
figurations are for example the residents of a village, city or nation. Chains of dependencies 
that bind such people together are not directly perceptible; they are very extensive and 
differentiated. The features of such complex figurations can be understood in more detail 
through the analysis of interdependency chains.
To illustrate the concept of figuration Elias likes to use the example of social dances 
[Elias 2006a: 50, 51; Elias 2006b: 28, 29], because he believes that the image of moving 
figurations of interdependent people dancing can help us to understand figurations such 
as family, city, state, or social formation. Let us imagine as a symbol of society a group of 
dancers performing court dances such as the française or quadrille, or a country round 
dance. The steps and bows, gestures and movements made by the individual dancer are 
all entirely meshed and synchronized with those of other dancers. If any of the dancing 
individuals were contemplated in isolation, the functions of his or her movements could 
not be understood. The way the individual behaves in this situation is determined by the 
relations of the dancers to each other.
The expressions and movements of individuals may in one way or another be individ-
ually coloured, but they are always focused on others. We can of course talk about dance 
and its rules in general, but we can hardly imagine it as something that exists completely 
outside human individuals. Like other social figuration, this figuration is relatively inde-
pendent of specific individuals, but in general it cannot do without individuals. 
Another analogy through which it is possible to demonstrate the issue of figurations, 
is that of a game [Elias 1970: 141–142]. If four people play cards, they form a figura-
tion, their action is interdependent. Although it is possible in this case to talk about the 
game as something autonomous (and say for example: “the game is going slowly”), it is 
essential, however, that the course of the game comes from the mutual entanglement 
of action of the four individuals involved. Figuration in this case means the “changing 
pattern” that players as a whole mutually make with their actions, in which they are 
engaged not only with their intellect, but with their whole personality. This figuration is 
formed by a structure of interdependent tension, in which participating individuals can 
stand as allies and also opponents to one another. The structural features of figuration 
streams therefore include the “fluctuating balance of power” [ibid: 143], which is at least 
bipolar, but mostly multi-polar, and which constitutes an integral element of all human 
relationships.
People and figurations change; and though these changes are inseparable and inter-
dependent they are on different levels and of different kinds. In contemporary, abun-
dantly differentiated society, the actions of individuals interweave to form long chains of 
functional relationships. Each human individual is thus involved in many such chains; 
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through the functions that he performs he is dependent on many other individuals, and 
they are dependent on him. Instead of the idea of the human being as something closed 
(homo clausus), Elias emphasizes the image of man as an “open personality”, more or 
less autonomous in relation to other people, though never absolutely and totally auton-
omous, because each through their life is grounded, oriented and dependent on others. 
The chains of these dependencies – not as visible and tangible as iron chains – are strong 
enough, but also elastic and changeable, and their arrangement is expressed by the term 
social structures [Elias 2006b: 25]. In their framework there is a – greater or lesser – 
space for individual decision making; there appear crossroads where people must make 
up their minds, and choices on which may depend the fate not only of themselves but 
of others.
Elias’s sociology of figuration was widely discussed in the 1980’s, when it was consid-
ered very promising, and hopes were placed in it. Today, with hindsight, we can say that 
these expectations were not fully met. One of the problems lies in the fact that Elias defined 
the concept of figuration very generally and roughly; he did not work it up in enough 
detail to be a fully understandable and unequivocally applicable research tool in the field 
of theory and research. Although today there is a considerable amount of special literature 
that uses the term figuration [e.g. Gabriel – Mennell 2011], those who use it often have to 
specify what they mean by it (and some researchers endow it with distinctive, subjectively 
framed ideas which can lead to problematic content-shifts, notably Gerard Noiriel [2012], 
who had little compunction in renaming Elias’s figuration “configuration”). What is miss-
ing in particular in Elias’s text is the resolution of the various structural levels at which the 
creation of figurations occurs, and specifics on the differences between these individual 
levels, because there is after all a difference between the figurations made by whist players, 
mazurka dancers, or the citizens of a modern state.
Personality and history 
Even if within his sociology of figurations Elias constantly emphasizes the participation 
of individuals in the creation of social reality, he tends to capture these individuals in the 
position of typical (average) representatives of certain social groups, classes or masses of 
human beings, whose main characteristic is that they carry a certain, historically formed 
type of collective human psyche, and so habitus. What we rarely find in Elias is reflection 
on the role of real human individuals, even though that he rejects the idea that all people 
are of equal importance to the course of history. Elias argues that individual beings cannot 
be understood as passive vehicles of the social machine, and stresses that their individual 
character along with personal decisions may have a significant influence on the course 
of historical events, but he also adds that the decision-making process of individuals is 
always limited, variable and depends on the instruments of power under their control 
[Elias 2006b: 67].
Current sociological thinking typically only acknowledges individual influence on 
the microsocial level, where the approaches of social constructivism are often explored. 
However, a generally neglected question remains whether, and how, actors can influence 
the macrosocial level. This is highlighted by Nicos Mouzelis, who states that the problem 
cannot be successfully tackled if we do not take sufficiently into account that society is 
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organized hierarchically, and ask what role is played within the hierarchy by so-called 
“macro-actors” [Mouzelis 2006: 20].
One of the problems to which contemporary sociological theory has no answer, and 
to which it even feels no need to look for an answer, is the question of how individuals 
can influence the macro-level of societal structures and processes. Even though the ques-
tion of actors as creators of social reality is accorded an important place in contemporary 
sociology, it is usual that attention is focused only on small anonymous actors and their 
everyday activities, observed on the micro-social level. It appears that when sociology has 
to deal with phenomena on a macro-social level, it is not able in principle to think other 
than through functionalism.
Although the issue of individuals with society-wide influence is quite common and 
legitimate in historical science, sociology, by contrast – one might say “on principle” – 
ignores it. With some simplification, we can say that, for many years, we have witnessed 
that while history tends to see social processes as the work of famous historical figures, 
sociology, on the contrary, tends to look at these processes as a manifestation of supra-in-
dividual social units, structures and powers, or social systems and their functions. Apart 
from contemporary orientations of historical research towards social history or the history 
of everyday life, we can say that for traditionally conceived history the past is mainly a con-
catenation of the acts of important individuals. Sociology, meanwhile, even contemporary 
sociology, sees in the past processes of social changes taking place at the level of culture, 
civilization and various forms of human coexistence or social formation. In other words, 
in historical science the individualistic approach is significantly gaining ground, whereas 
in historical sociology on the contrary the holistic approach is ever more dominant.
It is clear that a number of topics, particularly in the case of general trends in the devel-
opment of culture, civilization or modernity, can be monitored adequately from a holistic 
perspective, but doing so may ignore the role played by important historical figures. There 
are, however, research matters where the influence of these figures cannot be completely 
ignored. One such is the issue of European development after the Second World War. To 
explain this historical stage just as the movement of anonymous masses, or the dynam-
ics of general principles and tendencies, and ignore those who were the leaders and the 
“architects” of social transformations, would be inadequate. The individual element always 
plays a certain role in society, giving social development and social coexistence their spe-
cific features. As a result, new, unexpected phenomena emerge in social reality, and thus 
it is so difficult to predict social development. However, for understanding the problem of 
these individual “macro-actors”, sociology lacks adequate theoretical and methodological 
instrumentation. 
The conceptual apparatus which sociology has at its disposal, has its origins in the 
founders of sociological thinking. Max Weber developed the concept of three ideal types 
of domination (charisma, tradition and rational-legal) [Weber 1922], Vilfredo Pareto 
[1968] formulated the theory of elites, and Robert Michels [1931] focused his attention 
on party leaders. All of these older, but also more recent approaches, usually focus on 
the individual at the top of the social hierarchies identified as a particular social group 
or type, who also affected the social characteristics which from a sociological point of 
view may be considered essential, decisive and differentiating. However, what is mostly 
absent is an explanation of the mechanisms that enable these individuals’ actions to be 
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reflected in the formation of social structures. As an exception in this context we can 
mention Elias’s analysis of the “royal mechanism”, which the author gives in the second 
part of the work The Civilizing Process. Elias here shows that in court society, in which 
individuals are meshed into networks of interdependencies, the sovereign power is based 
on pitting potential opponents against each other. Thus they become worn out and none 
is strong enough to be able to turn against the ruler. In order to implement this policy, 
the absolute monarch uses his ability to split opportunities, goods and clerical functions. 
His action is determined by the effort to preserve the balance of power, according to the 
principle of “divide and rule”, which Elias indicates likewise as the “royal mechanism” 
[Elias 2007].
The issue of how a particular individual can affect his society and era, was the topic of 
Elias’ last work, a small book about Mozart [Elias 1991]. In it he focuses attention on the 
issue of brilliant talent in the history of art. While dealing with this, Elias tried to avoid 
two commonly encountered extremes. One of them is the approach dealing with the his-
tory of art as a succession of great personalities; the second, the reduction of the history 
of art to the mere transformation of structures and styles. Elias’s approach to this issue 
can be explained by the metaphor of the coin and stamp. Everyone within society may be 
compared to a coin that is shaped by a stamp representing social pressures, under whose 
influence the individual is also to be found. But at the same moment everyone is a stamp 
that, by its action in society and on others, leaves its own mark [Elias 2006b: 68]. Basi-
cally, these are two interdependent functions which mutually determine their existences. 
Even Mozart’s genius corresponds to this idea. Even he is represents both coin and stamp. 
Mozart’s musical personality was formed by contemporary influences and musical prac-
tices that he mastered in a perfect way. But he also managed to improve these procedures, 
innovatively transforming and developing new forms of musical expression. The role of 
genius thus lies in being, more than contemporaries, not only a coin but also a stamp, 
leaving an imprint on structures of a given area (or areas) of human activity and affecting 
its further development.
Elias’s little work on Mozart is often overlooked but in the context of the sociology of 
figuration is important because it shows how it is possible to approach the problem – so 
far generally paid very little attention in sociology – of the role played by specific figures 
in the framework of social development and the historical process. The approach that 
Elias offers is indicated rather generally but nevertheless provides important inspiration 
for further thought. 
The “Duplex” Conception
In the next part of the article, we will try to outline a solution to the problem of the “soci-
ety of individuals” that is significantly different from the Elias’s conception. We start from 
the assumption that the problem we are dealing with can be successfully solved neither by 
progressively interchanging the individualistic and holistic perspectives, nor by an effort to 
maximize the mutual approach of action and structure. The solution that we propose has 
to some extent been inspired by Émile and his concept of “homo duplex” [Durkheim 1913, 
1914 (1995)]. This strategy is not the transfer of dualism of action and structure to dual-
ity, as in the case of Giddens, but an approach in which all basic concepts – actor, action 
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and structure – are grasped from a perspective that is indicated in the above-mentioned 
Durkheimian concept. In other words, that it is not just necessary for both perspectives to 
approach each other maximally, but, so to speak, to “blend” in a theoretical interpretation 
that demonstrates that the terms with which we work in sociological theory – actor, action 
and structure – are by their very nature dualistic, which means they are “duplex”.
Durkheim notes that the human being is divided, and furthermore in an internal-
ly contradictory manner. He says that in each of us there are two consciousnesses, two 
aspects of our mental life: personal and impersonal. Our physical body, on the one hand, 
is the source of our endless needs and desires, of our egoism. Our socialized being, on the 
other hand, is the construct of the society that lives and acts through us and controls and 
diminishes the symptoms of our egoism through internalized moral principles.
Durkheim raises the question of the cause of the dualism of human nature and con-
cludes that this antinomy “corresponds essentially with the dual existences that we simulta-
neously lead”. One part of our existence is purely individual and rooted in our corporeality. 
The second part of our existence is social and in it we represent just an extension of society 
[ibid.: 30]. Society retains, according to the author, its own nature, and thus also demands 
quite different from those that are included in our individual nature. The interests of the 
whole are not necessarily identical with the interests of its parts. Therefore, society can 
neither form nor maintain its shape without requiring permanent sacrifices, which are 
difficult for us. Only by being superior to us does it force us to transcend ourselves. And to 
overcome ourselves means to strip off some element from our nature, which is not possible 
without greater or lesser degrees of tension [ibid.: 31].
In trying at this point to follow up Durkheim in a certain way and be inspired by his 
concept of “homo duplex”, we want to emphasize and update even that which Durkheim 
himself pushed aside in his theory – the consistent projection of a dualistic view of man 
not only onto the concept of the actor, but also in all other key concepts of sociological 
theory. Durkheim frequently expresses himself in terms and ideas which have to a certain 
extent become obsolete and anachronistic. We would not wish now to attempt to defend all 
his partial claims, but we should make efforts to utilise the most powerful elements which 
in our opinion hold validity and topicality even up to the present day, which in particular 
means the inner ambiguity of “homo duplex”. We would take and enhance this idea, but 
not strictly in the context and conceptual form in which the French sociologist uses it. We 
understand it rather as a kind of loose inspiration in exploring those issues which Durk-
heim did not deal with.1 We believe that in accepting this idea we can consistently derive 
further considerations on the nature of action, interaction, and structure, all of which may 
be looked at through prospect of “duplex”.
In individualistic conceptions actions tend to be seen as one-way acts that come from 
the individual and in most cases are oriented outwards so as to impress something or 
someone in the outside world. However, from the dialectical perspective the whole thing 
is more complicated. In the very act, from the very beginning, alongside the actor there is 
the other side, the world in which certain elements are striving to operate. The fact that one 
begins to act confirms the relevance of the rest of the world (regardless of whether it relates 
1 For this reason, in this text we do not engage in the specific context of religion and morality, in which the 
concept of “homo duplex” by Durkheim is set in or with the secondary literature that deal with this subject.
20
H I S T O R I C K Á  S O C I O L O G I E  1/2015
approvingly or disapprovingly). Every act intended to achieve something in this world is 
actually at the same time confirmation of its importance. 
A man driven by his individual will monitors the actions of his personal (Durkheim 
would probably say, egoistic) interests and intentions. However, this activity is simultane-
ously social, and for two reasons: first, it is oriented towards individuals and it must there-
fore reckon with the surrounding social reality, its rules and expectations; such action – 
to one degree or another – reproduces some general role with its respective structural 
formulas, which, as structuration theory says, are both supportive but also limitations on 
actions. The acting individual could not be an actor if he did not go through the process 
of socializing and learning certain societal demands, but at the same time the individual 
in his action must make certain decisions and choices that are often dependent not only 
on the social situation, but also on his purely individual skills, interests and preferences. 
Both components in human action – individual and social – interrelate, condition and 
support each other. 
In terms of work we could use two dimensions of action, distinguishing them by the 
terms “voluntarism” and “sociality”. Voluntarism means that action express the individual 
will or interest of the acting persons who are its very strong driving force. Both compo-
nents interact in the sense that one limits the other in the extent and degree to which they 
can be expressed in a specific action.2 In the existing theoretical conception voluntarism is 
often associated with the issue of motivation and choice; sociality is viewed as a problem 
for the anticipated action, which is mainly associated with the concept of its social role. 
While analytically it is possible to distinguish two components, it is extremely difficult 
because within action they may be multiply-linked.
Owing to the fact that the actions of human individuals relate to other individuals, 
there starts to exist a mutual influence; that is to say, interaction. These interactions may 
take different forms and intensities, ranging from ephemeral encounters to fixed steady 
relationships. Interaction theoretically described from the perspective “duplex” appears as 
a reciprocal relationship between two or more individuals, each of whom has individual 
and social components. Their individual actions also have a dual character; in each of them 
we may note a share of voluntarism and likewise sociality. In simplified model form it can 
be said that individuals A and B regard each other’s alter ego, seeing that the other – like 
himself – has his own properties and dispositions and that in his activities he follows his 
personal interests and goals, but meanwhile also seeing that he acts as representative of 
a certain role or institution, conforming in one way or another to general structural rules, 
regulations and behavioural patterns. At the individual level it is the mutual confrontation 
of two personalities, at the social level it is a matter of the reproduction of role patterns and 
institutional rules. Both the individual and social components of personalities and actions 
can through interaction represent both facilitating and inhibiting factors, and appear inter-
actively in many different combinations.
2 From the historical and cultural point of view it can be assumed that the proportions between voluntarism and 
sociality can be different in individual types of societies and social groups. As an example the choice of a life 
partner can help. In traditional societies the parents or relatives determine the life partner, and often they have 
to respect a variety of strict social rules; in modern society the individual usually has the right of choice, often 
based on very subjective criteria and feelings.
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From this perspective social structures can be understood as two levels of structural 
rules. On the first level there are the general rules that define the basic social institutions 
and set basic role positions and role activities. On the second level there are the specific 
rules that occur in the context of specific human groups, in which certain expectations are 
derived or enforced on the basis of the individual dispositions of their individual mem-
bers; these are the rules that are somehow negotiated within these groups, or imposed by 
power or force.
To illustrate the proposed approach we may use the simple example of the nuclear 
family as representative of typical social institutions and primary social groups. When 
thinking about the family as an institution, we give attention to the general rules that 
define the content of basic roles (mother, father, child), or – if we accept the functionalist 
approach – that determine the content of the basic functions (reproductive, protective, 
emotional, economic, educational) carried out by this structural unit. However, if we focus 
on a particular family as a small social group, we should turn our attention to another level 
of rules which has been formed or imposed by the specific characteristics, requirements 
and possibilities of individual family members (e.g. the rules over who is to pick the tod-
dler up from kindergarten, who mows the lawn, or who walks the dog). In this example, we 
note that institutional rules exist as if dictated by society, while the operating rules of spe-
cific human groups emerge from – to one extent or another – the individual characteristics 
of its members. In practice, the two types of rules interconnect in such a complementary 
way that it is hard to maintain any separation.
There are many similar examples we could mention that show the multilevel char-
acter of social structures. One instance would be a sporting event that takes place in 
accordance with the relevant rules of the sporting discipline, but the game itself is then 
further structured by the strategies and capabilities provided by the teams and their 
players. The functioning of various types of social groups, organizations and social sys-
tems can be considered in a similar way (eg. in the policy area, systems which generally 
can be described as democratic, applying democratic rules of governance, may differ 
in the specific form of their expression, both due to different procedural rules but also 
and in particular how the representatives of the leading political parties put into effect 
their power).
By no means do we want to deny that social systems are capable of self-regulation. The 
economic system most convincingly demonstrates this capability; it has a self-regulating 
mechanism that Adam Smith long ago dubbed “the invisible hand of the market”. However, 
as the crisis in this system has recently clearly shown, what is really happening is not just 
the result of the activity of some unrestrained supra-individual forces and system mech-
anisms, but the result of many human actors, especially those who, as top managers of 
financial institutions, made fatally incorrect economic decisions, which, as it turned out, 
had a massive impact.
Concerning the question of individuals with society-wide influence, the explanation 
which is on offer outlines that those individuals who, because of their social status (elite 
or monopoly position), have the opportunity to influence social macrostructures, are able 
to complement the level of general macro-structural rules with a further specific layer 
of rules which reflect their distinctive characters, the specifics of their activities, visions, 
ideas, wishes, discoveries, or even limitations, pathological tendencies, perverted ideas or 
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deviations. These may be dispersed, or even inflicted, on a societal scale, due to the power 
and influence these individuals hold. In such a way one can attempt to clarify – together 
with Plekhanov – “the roles of personality in history” both in positive and negative cases; 
in the above-mentioned way you can describe the substance of the impact of outstanding 
historical personalities as well as tyrants and dictators.
Conclusion
In this article we focus on problems of the traditional theoretical dilemma represent-
ed by the opposition of individualistic and holistic approaches. First, we have described 
the solution offered by Elias’s conception of figurations, then we have tried to outline 
a solution, which is to some extent inspired by Durkheim’s concept of “homo duplex”. 
In this approach we wanted to show that not only the human individual, but all the 
social reality which is the subject of sociological research, should be seen in the unity of 
two aspects simultaneously. The theory whose outline we have tried to present should 
be constructed so as to reflect the idea that the all phenomena of social life can always 
be viewed from both perspectives. These two aspects are not only complementary, but 
internally mutually conditional, and any interpretation conducted only from the posi-
tion of one of them is always necessarily one-sided and incomplete. Therefore we pro-
pose an approach to the formulation of theoretical concepts that reflects this ambiguity, 
showing that each surveyed problem can be approached from two perspectives at once. 
If we accept this presumption, then individual actor does not stand in opposition to 
supra-individual social structures and systems, but these concepts are so aligned that 
each of them always has its individual and its supra-individual (collective) component, 
and these are in mutual correspondence with other categories that are specified in a sim-
ilar way. The approach we are talking about is still rather a set of theoretical hypotheses. 
We do not anticipate from such an approach working out all the problems related to the 
matter of duality of action and structure; on the other hand, however, we believe that it 
is a perspective worthy of further development. 
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